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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) in a host 
country and human development. Human development comprises the education, health, and 
income opportunities available to people in a particular country. I assert that FDI can 
potentially enhance human development through economic growth and higher income in a 
host country. However, alongside these benefits, FDI can also have negative effects by 
worsening a host country’s income inequality. Given FDI’s counteracting positive and 
negative effects on human development, I propose that FDI’s net effect on human 
development takes the form of an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
I further predict that a host country’s institutional maturity, defined as the degree of 
institutional development within a country, plays an important role in understanding which 
national contexts strengthen or weaken this relationship. I contend that the inverted U-
shaped relationship between FDI and human development is moderated by a host country’s 
institutions, and assess this moderation with respect to two dimensions: business 
sophistication and transparency. Business sophistication measures the extent to which a 
country possesses supplier networks, technology production, and advanced business 
practices (World Economic Forum, 2015). My results show that countries with low 
business sophistication have a pronounced inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI and 
human development, while countries with high business sophistication experience an 
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attenuated effect (flattened inverted U-shaped). Similarly, transparency measures public-
sector employees and executives’ accountability and performance, as well as civil society’s 
access to information about public affairs (World Bank, 2016). My results show that 
economies with low transparency have a steeper inverted U-shaped relationship between 
FDI and human development; by contrast, economies with high transparency exhibit a 
flatter inverted U-shaped curve. 
My study makes three core contributions to the field. First, it adds to development 
economics scholars’ analysis of human development by proposing that income inequality is 
a key FDI cost. Therefore, while FDI can indeed enhance human development (as past 
studies have shown), it can also have a negative effect by worsening a host country’s 
income inequality. Second, my study facilitates better knowledge of the relationship 
between FDI and human development by integrating the positive and negative effects of 
this relationship. Third, in line with studies that propose the contingent effects of FDI 
(Meyer & Sinani, 2009), my study contributes to understanding how a host country’s 
institutional maturity in the private and public sectors affects the strength of FDI’s 
curvilinear effect on human development. 
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SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the financial lifeblood of globalization. Unsurprisingly, 
the study of FDI’s effects on host locations has been a matter of high priority for 
international business researchers for more than four decades. Unfortunately, there has been 
considerable divergence in the conclusions these various studies have reached. Some (e.g., 
Blomström, 1986; Blomström & Persson, 1983; Blomström & Wolff, 1994; Globerman, 
1979; Kokko, Tansini, & Zejan, 1996) have found evidence for FDI’s positive spillover 
effects on the productivity of domestic firms in host countries, while others have observed 
negative productivity spillover effects (Aitken & Harrison, 1999). This research continues 
to expand, highlighting both FDI’s benefits and costs for domestic firms (Driffield & Love, 
2007; Tian, 2007; Zhang, Li, Li, & Zhou, 2010). In addition, meta-analytic studies have 
offered an overall summary of the relationship between inward FDI and productivity 
spillover for a host country’s domestic firms (Gorg & Strobl, 2001; Meyer & Sinani, 2009). 
Yet these “FDI spillover” studies collectively describe only a narrow sliver of the 
effect inward FDI has on host countries. Their focus is almost solely on FDI’s productivity 
benefits (or costs) for domestic firms. The broader effects of FDI on human development in 
a host country, while unequivocally important, have received comparatively little attention. 
Human development comprises the education, health, and income opportunities available to 
people in a country (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015b). It is 
fundamental to human wellbeing, and constitutes the bedrock of freedom and opportunity 
for any human population (UNDP, 2015b). Further, according to recent accounts, over 70% 
of poor people today live in inadequate human development conditions (Melamed & 
Samman, 2013). However, despite the importance of human development for host country 
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populations, international business literature has largely ignored how FDI affects human 
development in host countries. 
Fortunately, in a separate strand of literature in the field of development economics, 
several studies have explored the link between FDI and human development. In general, 
they have found a positive association between the two (Arcelus, Sharma, & Srinivasan, 
2005; Lehnert, Benmamoun, & Zhao, 2013; Reiter & Steensma, 2010; Sharma & Gani, 
2004; Stiglitz, 2006). Some have also attempted to better understand the relevant mediators 
and moderators in the relationship between FDI and human development (Lehnert et al., 
2013; Reiter & Steensma, 2010). These studies have undoubtedly enhanced understanding 
of FDI’s effects on human development, although they have also largely been one-sided, 
overlooking the potential cost of FDI on human development. 
Thus, as a whole, current literature remains lacking in two respects. First, FDI 
spillover studies in international business literature must go beyond their narrow focus on 
how inward FDI affects domestic firms’ productivity; the broader effects of FDI on human 
development in host countries is simply too important to ignore. Second, a more balanced 
perspective on the effects of FDI on human development is needed—one that takes into 
account both positive and negative effects. 
My thesis attempts to meet these two needs (i) the effect of inward FDI on human 
development and (ii) the integrated outcome of both positive and negative effects of FDI. In 
doing so, I make three core arguments. First, I argue that a key cost of FDI for human 
development is income inequality (Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Chintrakarn, Herzer, & 
Nunnenkamp, 2012; Choi, 2006; Herzer, Hühne, & Nunnenkamp, 2014; Pan-Long, 1995). 
While FDI can indeed enhance human development (as past studies in the field of 
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development economics have shown) by improving host country’s income and growth. It 
can also have a negative effect by distributing these benefits unevenly, worsening the host 
country’s income inequality. Income inequality leads to unequal access to capabilities, and 
thus to uneven human development (Melamed & Samman, 2013). Second, given FDI’s 
counteracting positive and negative effects on human development, I propose that the net 
effect of these effects of FDI on host country’s human development is curvilinear. I 
therefore predict that FDI enhances economic growth and high income in the host country 
(Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998), and exerts a positive effect on human 
development. However, alongside these benefits, FDI also increases income inequality 
(Herzer et al., 2014); ultimately, these negative, income inequality-driven effects will 
outweigh FDI’s initial positive benefits which result in an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
Third, in line with studies that propose FDI’s contingent effects (Meyer & Sinani, 2009) 
and highlight the importance to understand when these effects affect differently the host 
country. I suggest that the strength of FDI’s curvilinear effect on human development 
depends on the host country’s institutional maturity in the private and public sectors. I 
assess the quality of institutions in the private and public sectors with respect to two 
dimensions: business sophistication and transparency, respectively. Business sophistication 
refers to the extent of the host country’s supplier networks, technology production, and 
advanced business practices (World Economic Forum, 2015). This dimension is likely to 
demonstrate whether a country has infrastructure and business system to support and 
channel multinational entities (MNEs) and their requirements which translates in countries 
that have strong, weak or absent private institutions. Transparency refers to the extent of 
public-sector executives and employees’ accountability and reliability in terms of their 
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activities and actions in the host country. This dimension is likely to demonstrate how well 
manage is the legal, business and public environment of the country which demonstrate the 
public business practices that shape and support the market for MNEs. I propose that the 
relationship between FDI and human development is most pronounced in countries with 
low business sophistication and transparency. 
To test my hypothesis, I sourced and matched data from multiple sources. I obtained 
data on human development from the UNDP (2015a), and then matched this with data on 
inward FDI flows and stock from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2016). I further matched my dataset with data on business 
sophistication and transparency from the World Economic Forum (2016) and the World 
Bank’s (2016) World Development Indicators database, respectively. Consistent with my 
expectations, I found that inward FDI has an inverted U-shaped relationship with human 
development in the host country. In addition, I found that countries with low business 
sophistication and transparency exhibit a more pronounced curvilinear relationship than 
those with high business sophistication and transparency.  
This thesis is organized into six sections. Following this introduction, in section 
two, I review the relevant literature. In section three, I explore how FDI affects human 
development, and formulate my hypotheses. In section four, I describe the data and 
methodology used. Section five provides my empirical results, and in section six, I 
conclude and discuss the contributions and implications of my findings. 
 
SECTION 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
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In this review, I summarize the existing literature regarding the different areas covered in 
this study. First, I examine the international business literature on FDI spillovers. Second, I 
summarize the development economics literature on (i) FDI positive spillovers, (ii) FDI 
negative spillovers, and (iii) human development. 
FDI spillovers (international business) 
Examining the effects of FDI, researchers within management, international business, and 
development economics have highlighted FDI’s powerful role on companies’ and 
countries’ fortunes (Gorg & Strobl, 2001). FDI spillovers have been examined at the micro 
level (e.g., organizations) and macro level (e.g., countries) (Figini & Gorg, 2011). 
International business literature has mainly focused on FDI spillovers in domestic 
firms. FDI spillovers occur when MNEs produce benefits for domestic companies and in 
aggregate for the host country (Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004). An abundance of literature has 
studied FDI and productivity spillovers in relation to domestic firms (Caves, 1974; Eapen, 
2012; Globerman, 1979; Head, Ries, & Swenson, 1995; X. Liu, Siler, Wang, & Wei, 2000). 
More specifically, MNEs are considered conduits of technology transfer (Buckley, Clegg, 
Wang, & Cross, 2002; Z. Liu, 2008). This gives local firms and people the opportunity to 
learn by interacting with and observing their advanced technologies, which allows domestic 
firms to upgrade their technology, upskill their employees, and acquire new knowledge 
(Buckley et al., 2002). Another benefit of FDI spillovers is that knowledge can be 
generated by MNEs’ research and development (R&D)—that is, productivity in domestic 
firms is influenced by R&D and export activities (Jefferson, Huamao, Xiaojing, & 
Xiaoyun, 2006; Wei & Liu, 2006). FDI has also been related to increased host-country 
competition; the effect of these benefits improves domestic efficiency, innovation, and 
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productivity (Marcin, 2008). Also a number of studies suggest that FDI generates 
knowledge spillovers on the host countries. Given the importance of knowledge for 
developing technology and economic growth in the host country, the literature has 
investigated this widely. A recent review of knowledge spillover has developed an 
analytical framework that integrates both micro and macro level antecedents of spillovers, 
this review analyzed three different constructs magnitude, speed and scope. This paper also 
highlights the importance of internal and external networks as well as role of social and 
political context to activate the flow of knowledge (Perri & Peruffo, 2016). Furthermore, 
FDI spillovers not only have been studied from a technology orientation, there has been 
found positive spillovers on managerial knowledge. These spillovers are diffused by tacit 
and explicit elements of management practices of MNEs (Fu, 2012).  
Most recently, studies have highlighted the importance of treating FDI differently 
by considering its motivation, nature, tenure and origin (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; De 
Mello, 1999; Zhang, Li, & Li, 2014). For example, Driffield and Love (2007) have 
observed that FDI motivation predicted its various effects on host countries’ domestic 
productivity. FDI motivation has been classified as technology exploiting and sourcing. 
Technology-exploiting FDI refers to MNEs that possess the “ownership” advantage, 
characterized by superior technology and capital stock quality (Driffield & Love, 2007); 
technology-sourcing FDI refers to MNEs that bring in limited technology, and is motivated 
by the need to acquire more knowledge by targeting specific locations to seek that 
knowledge and newer technology. Driffield and Love’s results suggest that high-
technology FDI has positive spillovers on the host country’s productivity, while low-
technology FDI leads to no productivity spillovers. Similarly, Ha & Giroud (2015) 
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addressed whether competence-creating or competence-exploiting activities by MNEs 
influence FDI spillovers on host country’s firms, and found that competence-creating 
activities of MNEs generate positive technology spillovers. In addition, Zhang et al. (2010) 
have examined the diversity of FDI country origins on domestic firms’ productivity, and 
found that this diversity can facilitate FDI spillovers by increasing the variety of technology 
and management practices that MNEs introduce into the host country. Summarizing 
previous findings, a large meta-analysis has established a positive relationship between FDI 
and productivity spillovers (Gorg & Strobl, 2001). Recently, in another meta-analysis, 
Meyer and Sinani (2009) applied competitive dynamics theory and observed a curvilinear 
relationship between FDI spillovers and the host country’s development level in terms of 
income, institutional framework, and human capital. Furthermore, a few studies have 
investigated the contingency factors such as the host countries’ absorptive capacity as well 
as institutional factors to explain the difference on spillover effects (Du, Harrison, & 
Jefferson, 2014; Sánchez-Sellero, Rosell-Martínez, & García-Vázquez, 2014; Wang, Gu, 
Tse, & Yim, 2013). Although such studies have become increasingly sophisticated, 
scholars have primarily studied FDI’s effect on domestic firms and left its broader social 
consequences unexplored. 
FDI spillovers (development economics) 
Development economics scholars have examined MNEs and their effect on host and home 
countries (Blomström & Kokko, 1998). Most of the literature has shown that FDI is 
positively related to economic growth (Borensztein et al., 1998), human capital, educational 
attainment (Kottaridi & Stengos, 2010), and domestic productivity (Gorg & Strobl, 2001; 
Kakwani, 1981). More recently, several studies have examined whether FDI enhances 
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human development (Arcelus et al., 2005; Lehnert et al., 2013; De Schutter, Swinnen, & 
Wouters, 2013; Reiter & Steensma, 2010; Sharma & Gani, 2004). Sharma and Gani (2004) 
have found a positive correlation between FDI and human development for middle- and 
low-income countries. Other studies have attempted to better understand this relationship 
by examining mediation and moderation effects. Lehnert et al. (2013) have concluded that 
the positive relationship between FDI and human development is mediated by the quality of 
national governance. Moreover, Reiter and Steensma (2010) have found this relationship to 
be moderated by FDI policy, and strongest when FDI policy restricts foreign investors from 
entering certain economic sectors. This study has also observed this relationship to be 
moderated by host-country corruption, and strongest when corruption is low. Similarly, 
Stiglitz (2006) has found a positive relationship between FDI and human development, 
with the strength of that relationship depending on the government’s capability to regulate 
the right balance between itself and the markets.  
Although it makes important contributions, this line of research has rarely 
connected with the substantial investigation that reveals evidence for negative FDI 
spillovers. Yet negative spillovers, particularly inequality, have been shown to adversely 
affect human development (Melamed & Samman, 2013). 
Negative FDI spillovers 
FDI spillovers are not always positive. Studies have increasingly demonstrated that FDI has 
negative effects (Haddad & Harrison, 1993); for example, Aitken and Harrison (1999) have 
found that foreign firms negatively affect domestic firms’ productivity, and suggested that 
increasing competition in the domestic market causes a crowding-out effect for domestic 
firms (Aitken & Harrison, 1999). Further, economic scholars have progressively raised 
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concerns over growing inequality. While FDI may offer benefits to the economy in which 
they locate, it is unclear whether the majority of individuals will benefit to the same extent 
(Figini & Gorg, 2011). For example, Herzer et al. (2014) have observed a positive 
relationship between FDI and income inequality. Similarly, FDI has been found to have a 
strong positive relationship with wage inequality (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Aitken, 
Harrison, & Lipsey, 1996; Feenstra & Hanson, 1997; Figini & Gorg, 2011). These studies 
have examined FDI and its association with higher wages for skilled workers, concluding 
that FDI affects the income and employments prospects of less skilled workers (Figini & 
Gorg, 2011; Herzer et al., 2014). This generates a rising demand for skilled workers, 
causing their wages to rise, and thus causing income and wage inequality to deteriorate 
(Aitken et al., 1996). In addition, various studies have argued that the extent to which FDI 
causes inequality depends on two factors: (i) FDI motivation and (ii) the host country’s 
capabilities to absorb the effects. These studies have noted that FDI focused on high-
technology flows toward economies with high educational levels, further contributing to the 
development of human capital in these economies (Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Blomström, 
Kokko, & Mucchielli, 2003). Conversely, economies with low levels of initial human 
capital attract assets-exploiting FDI, which plays a smaller role in the future development 
of these economies (Blomström et al., 2003). 
Human development 
Human development has recently been advanced as an issue of academic discussion. Many 
researchers have emphasized that globalization and foreign capital have been studied by 
only exploring markets and countries, while its effects on people have been largely 
overlooked (Streeten, 1999). Consequently, several studies have recently examined the 
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relationship between different predictors of human development. Sharma and Gani (2004) 
have studied FDI’s influence on the expanded conception of socioeconomic progress, such 
as human development, and concluded that a positive correlation exists between FDI and 
human development—this suggests that FDI slightly improves human development 
(Sharma & Gani, 2004). In addition, this study also found that FDI has a higher positive 
effect on middle-income countries (Sharma & Gani, 2004).  
Another determinant of human development is economic growth, which has been 
found to provide resources that facilitate sustained human development improvement 
(Ranis, Stewart, & Ramirez, 2000). This study has found a strong positive relationship 
between economic growth and human development—in particular, Ranis et al. (2000) have 
highlighted the importance of government expenditure on health and education, which in 
turn boosts human development (Ranis et al., 2000). They have also identified another link 
between human development and economic growth: that increased human development 
also increases national income (Ranis et al., 2000). The study has concluded that a mutual 
reinforcing upward spiral exists between economic growth and human development, in 
which high levels of economic growth lead to high levels of human development (Ranis et 
al., 2000). Similarly, Anand and Sen (2000) have observed a positive relationship between 
economic sustainability and human development.  
This thesis attempts to integrate present human development concerns with those of 
the future, and proposes the idea that future generations should receive the same attention 
those of today (Anand & Sen, 2000). While it is often assumed that economic growth leads 
to development, this has not always led to improvements in human development (S. Sen & 
Bhattacharya, 2001; Sharma & Gani, 2004; Stiglitz, 2006); this is because human 
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development depends on various other social and physical conditions, such as healthcare 
and access to education (S. Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001).  
In addition, the UNDP has closely studied how to enhance and advance human 
development. Employment has been identified as critical in this process, since it allows 
people to broaden their choices and opportunities (UNDP, 2015b). In addition this, other 
factors identified as creating better conditions for human development include participation 
in political and community life, environmental sustainability, human rights, and promoting 
equality and social justice (UNDP, 2015b). However, human development is also affected 
by four major challenges that have emerged in the last decade: climate change, poverty, the 
employment crisis, and inequality. These challenges affect human development by limiting 
people’s opportunities and worsening their living standards (Hall, Hackmann, Van der 
Hoeven, & Heintz, 2013). Thus, these studies have accentuated the importance of the 
various factors that can enhance and diminish human development. More pressingly, they 
suggest that human development requires a much more complex examination than simply 
identifying the positive and negative effects. 
In this literature review, I have determined two important research gaps. First, there 
is a need to extend the present narrow view of how FDI spillovers affect host economies to 
encompass a social dimension. Unfortunately, international business scholars have thus far 
focused largely on the effects of FDI on domestic firms’ productivity and learning, leaving 
human development unexplored. Second, previous studies have examined either the 
positive or negative effects of FDI on human development. However, as emphasized by 
Hall et al. (2013), human development faces major challenges in this decade, thus 
prompting a need to consider FDI’s more integrated effects on human development. 
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SECTION 3 - THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
I propose that modest levels of FDI enhance human development through economic growth 
and higher income, but that these positive benefits taper off as FDI increases. Alongside 
these benefits, the cost of FDI (greater income inequality) also increases which refers to the 
extent to which income is distributed in an uneven manner among a population (Inequality 
Org, 2017).  I argue that these counteracting forces of positive and negative FDI effects on 
human development create an inverted U-shaped relationship (Haans, Pieters, & He, 2016). 
In this study, the predictor is inward FDI stock which measures the total level of foreign 
direct investment at the end of year (UNCTAD, 2016). Particularly, it accumulates the 
value of foreign assets at a given point which captures long lasting effects. Furthermore, I 
adopt the United Nations’ definition of human development which emphasizes that people 
and their capabilities should be the criteria for assessing the development of a country 
(UNDP, 2015b). This measurement comprises three components: (i) health, (ii) education, 
and (iii) income (UNDP, 2015b). In this section, I build my arguments for how FDI affects 
each of these components. 
Benefits of FDI for human development 
FDI can potentially promote technology and economic growth in the host country 
(Borensztein et al., 1998). Incoming foreign investments boost economic growth and 
income in the host country through three mechanisms: (i) greater employment, (ii) greater 
revenue received by the government, and (iii) MNEs’ technology diffusion. Such growth 
drivers collectively contribute to the host country’s greater national economic 
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competitiveness and human development (Ranis et al., 2000). It is reasonable to expect that 
the marginal positive effect of FDI will increase only at a decreasing rate. 
First, FDI increases demand for employees, thus expanding labor force participation 
(Feenstra & Hanson, 1997). This increased demand drives wage inflation and higher 
income for workers. Income, although potentially going toward a range of expenditures, 
also trickles down to factors associated with human development, such as education and 
health (Ranis et al., 2000). Indeed, higher income has been positively related to more years 
spent at school, and a higher average education threshold (Brückner & Gradstein, 2013). 
Higher income potentially enables members of the host country’s population to invest in 
their own and their family’s education. This, in turn, enables individuals to undertake 
higher level skilled employment, or even to launch their own companies (Spender, 2013). 
This shift in income is also associated with health improvements (Bloom & Canning, 
2000), as individuals tend to spend a larger share of their income on healthcare and 
improving their living standards and, thereby, human development (Acemoglu, Finkelstein, 
& Notowidigdo, 2013). 
The second FDI benefit is increased government tax revenues, which then allow 
governments to increase investment and public spending (Basu, Chakraborty, & Reagle, 
2003) and allocate more resources to activities that contribute to human development. 
These could include the host country’s social infrastructure to improve education, health, 
poverty rates, subsistence, or support for the unemployed, which in turn reduces poverty 
(Ranis et al., 2000). 
Finally, the presence of MNEs encourages technology diffusion, which contributes 
to the host country’s economic growth (Borensztein et al., 1998; Z. Liu, 2008; Walz, 1997). 
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Technology diffusion can occur through knowledge transfer and exposure to new 
technology (Borensztein et al., 1998). MNE, with a broader network of subsidiaries 
spanning the globe, may have grown as a consequence of excelling in a variety of business 
areas such as strategy, innovation, technology, or management practices. These valuable 
practices can spill over to domestic firms and, as a result, enhance their efficiency and 
technology (Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Z. Liu, 2008). Thus, technology diffusion can be 
an important conduit of economic development and growth (Borensztein et al., 1998) and 
translate to greater human development (Ranis et al., 2000).  
Costs of FDI for human development 
While FDI brings benefits to the host country, evidence also suggests that these benefits are 
not always evenly distributed across society. Some individuals benefit considerably more 
than others from such opportunities (Figini & Gorg, 2011). Although foreign firms may 
require workers of all types, labor shortages for those with technical or managerial 
capabilities mean that these workers will be paid disproportionately more. For example, 
highly skilled and educated professionals who may be in short supply are more likely to 
reap the most benefit. Strong demand and higher wages in comparison with compatriots 
results in increasing income inequality. MNEs seek educated individuals and invest heavily 
in developing their capabilities by offering training and education to establish a highly 
skilled workforce. Some have argued that this phenomenon has accelerated with technology 
diffusion and rising international trade (Figini & Gorg, 2011; Taylor & Driffield, 2005). 
Further, the domestic labor market might experience the “skill-stealing effect,” where 
MNEs demand the best workers and leave those less skilled (Girma, Greenaway, & 
Wakelin, 2001). Such trends de-emphasize the role of less skilled labor, pushing income 
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down for low-skilled workers. Moreover, MNEs generally pay higher wages for all type of 
employees than comparable domestic companies (Figini & Gorg, 2011; Girma & Görg, 
2007; International Labour Organization, 2015). Thus, the increased demand for skilled 
workers and higher wages drives up income for high-skilled labor, widening the skilled‒
unskilled income gap, and deepening inequality (Gopinath & Chen, 2003; Herzer et al., 
2014). The consequences of different rents being accrued by different sets of individuals is 
that FDI leads to increasing inequality (e.g., across wages, human capital, and income). 
Inequality, especially income inequality, has a significant negative effect on the host 
country’s development and growth (Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Feenstra & Hanson, 1997; 
Figini & Gorg, 2011; Herzer et al., 2014). Income inequality refers to the concentration of 
wealth among a small proportion of the population, which reduces the spending power of 
most of the population. More importantly, it triggers reduced income and health (Ostry & 
Berg, 2011). This restricts the accumulation of human capital and undermines education, 
hindering skills development for deprived individuals (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2014; Stewart & Samman, 2014). In this study, given the 
robust link with economic prosperity, I focus on income inequality. 
Higher rates of income inequality tend to substantially diminish per-capita income 
levels, slow economic improvement, deteriorate living standards, and increase poverty 
(Melamed & Samman, 2013). At the individual level, income inequality creates a stratified 
society (i.e., a pyramid effect) with the majority of individuals at the bottom. These 
individuals might experience a stronger inequality effect, which has negative repercussions 
for income per capita, living standards, and educational development compared with those 
at the top. At the aggregate, national level, higher income inequality causes negative effects 
18 
on the extent of growth spells (Cornia, 2004). The length of growth is critical to achieving 
sustainable development, which translates into equal opportunities and human development 
improvements (Ostry & Berg, 2011). Therefore, countries with less equal income 
distribution tend to experience shorter and unsustainable growth periods (Ostry & Berg, 
2011). Further, health is significantly affected when income per capita decreases 
(Subramanian & Kawachi, 2004)—individuals have fewer resources to invest in their own 
health, thus reducing their life expectancy. Income inequality results in high-income 
earners having better access to healthcare; by contrast, those who have not achieved a 
certain income threshold have difficulties accessing healthcare (Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2006). 
Income inequality also negatively affects educational attainment (Mayer, 2000). 
The gap between low- and high-income earners results in a variation between their 
children’s education levels, as it may reduce low-income individuals’ capacity to invest in 
education (Ostry & Berg, 2011). Affluent, higher income parents will have more resources 
to ensure their children’s academic success, whereas children from low-income families 
start their educational life with more challenges and fewer resources (Haveman & 
Smeeding, 2006). The uneducated labor force faces a lack of opportunities to generate 
higher income or obtain financial aid to assure their own and their children’s education 
(Ostry & Berg, 2011). Hence, students with fewer resources are less well prepared for 
academic life (Haveman & Smeeding, 2006). Moreover, income inequality escalates the 
cost of high-quality education—for example, it elevates the cost of attending college far 
more for low-income students than for high-income students (Haveman & Smeeding, 
2006). This causes a lack of human capital in an environment where less skilled employees 
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are unable to access education that facilitates earning greater income and access to modern 
technology (Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Feenstra & Hanson, 1997). Finally, income inequality 
has a contagion effect in that it is transferred to subsequent generations (Melamed & 
Samman, 2013). It has particularly negative consequences for poorer children’s educational 
outcomes and college graduation rates (Haveman & Smeeding, 2006). For instance, in 2016 
China is the third largest receiver of inward foreign investment. It received around US$ 134 
billion (UNCTAD, 2017). Yet, China’s human development is 0.738 which is considered 
rank 90 around the world (UNDP, 2015a). Considering the largest amount of foreign 
investment, their human development is still very low and has not increased as much as it 
would have been expected. This phenomenon is increasingly raising in the world which 
supports our first argument. In sum, based on the above findings, the negative effects of 
FDI on human development increase while its positive effects increase, only at a decreasing 
rate. Hence, I expect: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between inward FDI and 
human development in the host country. 
Moderating role of institutions: Business sophistication and transparency 
Institutions effectively define accepted business practices (i.e., the “rules of the game”) in 
commerce and industry (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012). Institutions are crucial to shaping 
and supporting the markets in which domestic and foreign firms interact (Campbell & 
Lindberg, 1990; De Soto, 2000; Greif, 2006; A. Sen, 1999). At the organizational level, 
institutions create and manage the existing rules that determine MNEs’ actions and 
strategies in the host country (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). At an aggregate level, 
institutions play an important role in economic growth and the norms and accepted business 
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practices that determine economic development (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). 
Therefore, it is important to understand and analyze how institutions channel FDI and, in 
turn, the expectations of MNEs and the business practices they implement (Banerjee & 
Duflo, 2011). Yet there is considerable variation across different economies regarding the 
extent to which institutions might be present and strong, or absent and weak. Strong 
institutions connote an environment in which domestic players are already established and 
have secure regulations for businesses in the private sector and the transparent public 
sector. In this environment, new players become a part of an existing system and, as they 
are thus less likely to shape these markets, are more likely to comply with existing business 
rules and transparent regulations. Conversely, weak or absent institutions create an 
environment in which economies experience lack of knowledge and opportunities and 
relatively uncontrolled market systems (Crow, 2001; Mair et al., 2012; Rodrik, 2008), as a 
result of their limited clarity or transparency of expected business practices and regulations. 
Thus, new entrants have far greater latitude to be active participants that serve as agents of 
change (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). 
In this study, I consider both private- and public-sector institutions. I use the term 
“business sophistication” as a proxy for institutions, practices, and business environment in 
the private sector. This includes a country’s overall business networks and the quality of 
individual firms’ operations and strategies (World Economic Forum, 2015). For public-
sector institutions, I use the terms “transparency,” “accountability,” and “corruption index” 
as proxies for public-sector institutions and regulations. Transparency refers to the extent to 
which government employees are held accountable for administrative decisions and their 
use of funds and resources (World Bank, 2016). Economies that have little business 
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sophistication and transparency are considered to have weak local institutions, while 
economies with high business sophistication and high transparency possess strong local 
institutions. This is important in terms of understanding the effects of FDI, as institutions 
play a significant role in determining how FDI is channeled and invested (Meyer & Sinani, 
2009) and are likely to influence the extent to which FDI enhances human development. In 
the following subsections, I explain my arguments when institutions are strong and weak 
for each of these two moderators: business sophistication and transparency. 
Business sophistication 
I theorize that the strength of the relationship between FDI and human development 
depends on the host nation’s level of business sophistication. Business sophistication 
measures the extent to which a country possesses advanced supplier networks, 
technologically up-to-date production processes, and many elements of the value chain, 
from marketing and logistics to international sales structures. Three interrelated constructs 
regarding the extent to which a country possesses an advanced commercial economy have 
been identified by the World Economic Forum (2015) as the presence of (i) networks and 
suppliers (quality and quantity of suppliers and state of cluster development), (ii) the nature 
of the country’s competitive advantage (competitive advantage and production process 
sophistication), and (iii) the extent to which existing domestic firms encompass a range of 
value chain activities (value chain breadth, control of international distribution, extent of 
marketing, and willingness to delegate authority). For less sophisticated economies, I 
predict that the relationship between FDI and human development takes the form of a more 
pronounced inverted U-shape. For more sophisticated economies, I predict that the inverted 
U-shaped curve will be weaker (attenuated) such that the increasing slope is less and the 
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decreasing slope equally less negative. I now explain the arguments for each of these two 
scenarios based on the varying reasons MNEs have a different effect on benefits and costs. 
In less sophisticated economies, international capital is invested in a relatively 
undeveloped business environment that lacks suppliers’ products, processes, and marketing. 
To succeed, MNEs are more likely to need to build these elements, as they are required by 
every industry. International entrants must invest in a range of infrastructure to support 
their activities and success. With low levels of FDI, this is particularly important for 
boosting the local economy and fostering economic growth. These investments inject 
capital to advance business practice, which in turn generates more employment and 
increases workforce participation. Alongside this, foreign investments are more likely to 
provide higher revenue to governments and encourage the development of educational 
systems that support these industries; they also help enhance educational attainment and 
build human capital, which are key elements of economic growth (Barro & Lee, 2001) and 
human development. Yet as MNEs’ investment increases, the costs of this will most 
probably also rise. In this context, such capital shapes the economy and the role of foreign 
firms in the host country as a market maker, and MNEs then tend to have higher leverage 
and control over domestic firms, government, and local economy. Therefore, as a 
consequence of building the market, MNEs are feasibly able to negotiate reduced tax rates 
and favorable transactions that allow them to improve their profit margins. In addition, 
MNEs are more likely to offer high wages only to specific parts of the workforce (i.e., 
executives) who may be in short supply, and pay relatively low wages to the bulk of the 
workforce to drive down costs. MNEs thus create a gap between skilled and unskilled 
employees’ income, minimizing incidental investment in education, training, and upgrading 
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skills. As a consequence, rather than this capital being invested in the country and its social 
infrastructure, it goes toward MNEs reducing and constraining government income and 
wages. This diminishes wage growth and resources for health and education expenditure. 
Beyond this, given MNEs’ powerful leverage as both a major source of capital and a 
probable market maker, they may even appropriate resources. In this context, MNEs pay 
minimal resources to their countries of investment, but substantially extract from these 
countries to increase their own profits; this translates to decreased human development. 
These different negative forces thus curtail the host country’s resources for individuals and 
government, leading to rising income inequality and scant increases in government 
revenue, which significantly diminishes human development. 
In comparison, sophisticated economies have a developed network market 
comprising technological- and knowledge-intensive processes and productions. These 
economies create the potential for superior technology and technical capabilities that reflect 
their sophisticated nature (Driffield & Love, 2007). A key element of innovative national 
culture is the education level of the workforce, which is characterized by robust human 
capital supplier networks and developed business practices and strategies. These economies 
have a domestic incentive to enhance education and domestic market rules and procedures. 
To succeed, MNEs are more likely to adapt and follow domestic business practices since, in 
this context, the host country’s business environment is well established and shapes the 
interaction between domestic and foreign firms’ networks. At low levels of FDI, MNEs are 
less able to be active participants in the economy, and the host country will probably gain 
modest benefits, since it has achieved a certain level of economic development in its 
practices, strategies, and markets, and independence from foreign businesses. Thus, FDI 
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boosts the host country’s economic vibrancy, enhancing existing liquidity and investment. 
Yet, given these economies possess existing and developed markets the influence of FDI 
will be reduced. This translates to low and moderate increases in government income, 
economic growth and, in turn, human development.  
Nevertheless, at high levels of FDI, MNEs are more likely to undertake a different 
role and shape the economy in which they acquire power and leverage in the host country. 
MNEs may influence these markets and take advantage of higher margins; this can generate 
lower government income and decrease workforce costs. This might trigger the negative 
costs associated with FDI, including less government income and higher leverage, which 
triggers income inequality in the host country. However, these negative costs are unlikely 
to be as high as those caused by new entrants in less sophisticated business markets. Thus, 
in high-sophisticated economies, FDI brings low benefits and costs, which translates to an 
attenuated relationship between FDI and human development: 
Hypothesis 2.1: Business sophistication moderates the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between FDI and human development in such a way that the inverted 
U-shape will be steeper in locations with a low level of business sophistication and 
flatter in locations with a high level of business sophistication. 
Transparency 
I propose that the strength of the relationship between FDI and human development 
depends on the host nation’s level of transparency. Transparency has been defined and 
measured by the World Bank (2016) as public-sector employees’ accountability and 
transparency in terms of their decision-making processes and use of funds. This includes 
the presence of (i) executives’ accountability to oversee institutions, (ii) public-sector 
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employees’ accountability and performance, and (iii) civil society’s access to information 
about public affairs (World Bank, 2016). For economies with low transparency, I predict 
that the relationship between FDI and human development will take the form of a more 
pronounced inverted U-shape. For economies with high transparency, I predict that the 
inverted U-shaped curve will be weaker (attenuated), such that the increasing slope is less 
and the decreasing slope is equally less negative. Thus, low-transparency economies with 
low-to-moderate FDI levels will experience significant human development benefits, but 
these will decrease as the costs of FDI increase, thus diminishing human development. By 
contrast, high-transparency economies with low FDI levels will experience modest human 
development improvements. Equally, as FDI increases, as there are a few costs involved, 
there are limited negative or non-significant effects on human development. I now explain 
these two scenarios. 
Economies with low transparency experience an absence of clarity and 
accountability regarding their executives and employees’ decision-making, processes, and 
procedures in the public sector. These economies lack transparent government actions and 
existing, formal public-sector regulations. There is likely to be little clarity about 
government involvement in factors that affect human development and a resource-scarce 
environment in which social problems are abundant (Stephan, Uhlaner, & Stride, 2015). In 
addition, these economies might experience higher corruption, which drains country funds, 
diminishing economic growth (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). The accumulation of these factors 
may trigger higher social needs (Dacin, Dacin, & Matear, 2010), such as lack of education, 
health, and income. Consequently, these economies have higher need for improvements in 
public-sector policies, actions, and procedures. At low levels of FDI, MNEs are particularly 
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helpful for developing the institutional environment in such a way that foreign business 
may positively influence the host country’s policies and procedures, and be more likely to 
exercise regulatory and demonstration effects on the host country’s public institutions 
(Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). These effects put pressure on public institutions to restructure at 
a more global level, thus enabling them to gain legitimacy and enact clear and transparent 
policies and practices (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). These changes can potentially re-allocate 
funds to a more efficient and proper manner (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006), thus increasing 
government revenue and, in turn, enhancing public expenditure on education, health, and 
higher income per capita. Therefore, FDI increases human development in the host country, 
offering opportunities for positive change and the restructure of public institutions by re-
allocating funds to government and increasing employees’ wages.  
Yet as FDI grows, the costs of FDI are also likely to rise. In this context, foreign 
capital might acquire more leverage over public practices and processes, which gives 
MNEs more control over public-sector funds. This increased leverage comes at a cost, 
affecting both individuals and the host country. Specifically, MNEs have greater 
opportunity to extract resources from the host country with little accountability. In this 
context, MNEs will probably try reducing business costs, which can lead to low pay rates 
for the majority of the workforce, and to offer higher pay to those influential in gaining 
access to key resources (i.e. permits) and public-sector executives and employees. In 
addition, public-sector employees are more likely to receive a higher salary. This 
phenomenon increases inequality between those who are more influential and those who 
are not. This rising inequality affects human development by depriving individuals with 
fewer resources access to education, health, and a decent income. Thus, these factors 
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negatively shape human development by compromising individuals’ access to vital 
resources. 
By comparison, high-transparency economies are more likely to have clear and 
transparent rules, actions, and procedures within the host country’s public sector (Stephan 
et al., 2015). These economies are characterized by active governments that are able to 
allocate resources more efficiently in an environment built on trust and ethical conduct 
(Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Moreover, these nations ensure legitimacy in their dealings with 
MNEs through joint ventures or business relationships such as value chains (Eden, Levitas, 
& Martinez, 1997). Therefore, economies with high transparency can potentially allocate 
their resources efficiently and effectively, which allows them to acquire better capabilities 
in terms of social and economic benefits and thus establish a more robust public sector, and 
to meet social needs such as education, health, and income. At low levels of FDI, new 
foreign entrants are unlikely to contribute as much to the development of the public sector; 
these economies might achieve standardized clear and transparent policies, procedures, 
public-sector employee roles. Thus, when FDI has minimal effects on a host economy, the 
human development benefits are also smaller. As opposed to economies with low 
transparency, as FDI increases in high-transparency economies, MNEs are less able to gain 
leverage and control over public policies, processes, and practice. Specifically, 
governments in these economies are liable to be accountable for their actions and possess 
firm, transparent policies; foreign companies will thus experience a well-regulated public 
sector. MNEs might find it difficult to gain advantage and leverage over resources and 
funds. Therefore, the costs associated with the effects of FDI on the host country’s public 
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sector and, more importantly, FDI’s negative consequences on human development are 
non-significant. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2.2: Transparency moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between FDI and human development in such a way that the inverted U-shape will 
be steeper in locations with a low level of transparency and flatter in locations with 
a high level of transparency. 
 
SECTION 4 - DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
I now attempt to explain the cross-country variation on human development based on the 
extent of foreign investment in different economies. Because of the methodological 
constraint of the dependent variable, which can only be measured at the country level, the 
best data fit for this study is at the aggregated level. Therefore, I constructed a database 
comprising a set of variables from various sources to take advantage of these variables’ 
diversity and controls. Measures of human development (the dependent variable) and its 
components (education index, health index, and income per capita) come from the UNDP 
(2015a), measures of foreign investment (the independent variable) come from the 
UNCTAD (2016), and the moderators (business sophistication and transparency index) 
come from the World Economic Forum (2016) and the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2016). Finally, other controls were collected from the International Monetary 
Fund (2016) and the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016). My sample is an 
unbalanced panel data that includes these sets of variables up to 139 countries over 14 years 
(2000‒2014), which allowed me to analyze the data as panel. In addition, I lagged all 
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country-level variables by at least one year to reduce potential endogeneity between the 
hypothesized antecedents and the outcome variable. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), which 
measures the development of a country based on their population capabilities. This measure 
combines three important aspects: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent 
standard of living (UNDP, 2015b). A long and healthy life was measured by life 
expectancy at birth. The ability to acquire knowledge was measured by mean years of 
schooling and expected years of schooling. Finally, the ability to achieve a decent standard 
of living was measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. HDI was an 
unweighted average of these three aspects, with an upper limit of 1.0 (UNDP, 2015b). This 
measurement was considered the best fit for this study, as it includes both economic and 
social aspects. In addition, the three elements were considered separately in the analysis as 
robustness tests. The data were collected from the UNDP (2015a) database. 
Independent variable 
FDI was measured by inward FDI stock which was presented at book value (historical 
cost). This measure contains the inward investments on the original price at the time it was 
made—it accumulates FDI inflows over a period, which effectively captures the long-term 
effects. FDI inflows captures incoming flows from MNEs, such as equity capital, 
reinvestment of earnings, and other short and long-term capital (Basu & Guariglia, 2007). 
These inflows were presented on net bases (new investment inflows less disinvestment), or 
capital transactions’ credits less debits between direct investors and their foreign affiliates 
(Kottaridi & Stengos, 2010). Net decreases in assets or net increases in liabilities were 
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recorded as credits (with a positive sign), while net increases in assets or net decreases in 
liabilities were recorded as debits (with a negative sign). Further, as part of the robustness 
tests, two different constructs were used as a predictor of human development: FDI inflows 
and inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP (inward FDI stock/GDP) to verify that the 
results supported the main effects. These data were collected from the UNCTAD (2016). 
 
Moderators 
Business sophistication represents two linked elements: the quality of a country’s overall 
business networks and the quality of individual firms’ operations and strategies (World 
Economic Forum, 2015). First, the quality of business networks and supporting industries 
was measured by the quantity and quality of local suppliers and the extent of their 
interaction. Second, individual firms’ operations and strategies were measured by the 
spillover effect of branding, marketing, distribution, advanced production processes, and 
the production of unique and sophisticated products into the economy, leading to 
sophisticated and modern business processes across the country’s business sectors (World 
Economic Forum, 2015). The index used was a 7-point scale, with 1 the lowest and 7 the 
highest. The data were collected from the World Economic Forum database (World 
Economic Forum, 2016). Appendix 1 summarizes the measurements of this index. 
Transparency index was measured by three main public-sector dimensions. First, 
executives’ accountability in terms of overseeing institutions, and public-sector employees’ 
accountability and performance; second, civil society’s access to information about public 
affairs; and third, the state capture by narrow vested interests. The index used was a 6-point 
scale, with 1 the lowest and 6 the highest. The transparency index is part of the Country 
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Policy and Institutional Assessment database, and the data were collected from the World 
Bank (2016). 
Controls 
Foreign aid is considered one of the most important sources of foreign funding for human 
development and economic growth (Gomanee, Girma, & Morrissey, 2005; Kosack & 
Tobin, 2006). The UNDP (2015b) has pointed out that foreign donors significantly 
contribute to achieving greater human development. The data represent the net bilateral aid 
flows from Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, which are the net 
disbursements of official development assistance or official aid from DAC members. Net 
disbursements are gross payments of grants and loans minus repayments of principal on 
earlier loans. The data were collected from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2016). 
Trade openness was defined and measured as total imports plus total exports (Figini 
& Gorg, 2011). Countries have increasingly opened their trade barriers and allowed more 
inward FDI as part of the growing interconnectivity and advancement of globalization, such 
as industrialization and technology (World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization, 2004). Trade openness affects human development via two different paths. 
First, countries begin exporting more, boosting economic growth and income. Second, 
trading allows countries to gain knowledge, expertise, and technology (Cooray, Mallick, & 
Dutta, 2014). The data were collected from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2016) and presented as percentages of GDP. 
Government savings have also been considered a determinant of human 
development; countries with higher savings tend to have better human and economic 
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performance (Caceres & Caceres, 2015). In particular, the importance of savings has been 
demonstrated in a comparison made by Thimann and Dayal-Gulati (1997) between South 
East Asia and Latin America, revealing that regions with greater savings improved their 
development. In this study, this was measured by the gross national savings as a percentage 
of GDP, and data were collected from the International Monetary Database (International 
Monetary Fund, 2016). 
Gross national expenditure is the amount of money the government and the 
population expend in the host country. Governments’ spending on social infrastructure 
(e.g., hospitals, schools) facilitates better systems for, and access to, basic human needs, 
thus improving human development. Second, increased expenditure from the population 
means that people have more opportunities to earn and spend on education to develop their 
capabilities (Kottaridi & Stengos, 2010). The data represent the sum of household final 
consumption expenditure, general government final consumption expenditure, and gross 
capital formation. This construct was measured in constant US dollars using the exchange 
rate of 2005 and the data were extracted from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2016). 
GDP has been proven to lead to better human development (Ranis et al., 2000). The 
data represent GDP at purchasers’ prices, which is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the products’ value. It was calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The 
data were extracted from the World Development Indicators and expressed in constant US 
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dollars using the exchange rate of 2005. Dollar figures for GDP were converted from 
domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates (World Bank, 2016). 
Methodology 
To examine my hypotheses, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with fixed 
effects. More specifically, I tested for fixed versus random effect using the Hausman test. 
Based on this test, I employed the fixed effects model. The advantage of estimating fixed 
effects is that it accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across 
countries; controlling for these factors thus accounted for any unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries. Following this line of enquiry, countries may not only contrast in terms of 
their systematic societal characteristics, but feature varying slopes to their growth paths 
because of prolonged differences such as technological progress (Binder & Georgiadis, 
2010). Generally, in panel data analysis, the fixed effects model assumes that each country 
differs in its intercept term (Ranjan & Agrawal, 2011). Finally, the use of a lagged structure 
across the model allowed for a stricter test of the causal relationship. 
In addition, I followed the three-step procedures used by Haans et al. (2016) to test 
the inverted U-shaped relationship. First, the FDI coefficient (!FDI) had to be positively 
significant and the FDI-squared coefficient (!FDI-squared) had to be negatively significant. 
Second, the slope had to be sufficiently steep at both ends of the data range. I took two 
points at the low and high end of the X-range, the lowest point of FDI (FDIL), and the 
highest point of FDI (FDIH). I tested for an inverted U-shaped relationship, showing that 
the slope at the lowest point of FDI using !FDI + 2!FDI-squared*FDIL was positive and 
significant, and the slope at the highest point of FDI using !FDI + 2!FDI-squared*FDIH was 
negative and significant. Finally, I tested the turning point of the inverted U-shaped 
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relationship using –!FDI/2!FDI-squared. If this turning point was located well within the data 
range, it established the existence of an inverted U-shaped curve. 
 
SECTION 5 - ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In this thesis, the analysis includes two sets of results. The first analysis includes 
government expenditure as a control variable (Tables analysis I). Nonetheless the 
correlations and further tests such as the variance inflation factor results on government 
expenditure highlighted a problem with collinearity. As a consequence, a second analysis 
was run in which government expenditure has not been included as a control variable 
(Tables analysis II). Fortunately, these two different analysis have been similar and both 
sets of results supported the hypothesis. The results discussed in the following section 
belong to the second analysis. 
In tables analysis II, Table 1 presents the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics 
for the model variables. Table 2 presents the results for the OLS with fixed effects 
estimation, testing hypotheses 1, 2.1, and 2.2. Table 3 presents the results for tests of the 
inverted U-shape for main effects and moderation effects. Tables 4 and 5 present the 
robustness tests of the main effects and the human development components, respectively. 
Tables 6 and 7 present the robustness tests of the inverted U-shape. Finally, table 8 presents 
the multicollinearity test results. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows that, on average, FDI has a positive correlation with human development. 
This provides general support for the idea that FDI contributes to human development. In 
addition, business sophistication and transparency also positively correlate with human 
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development. However, the correlations between major variables are high, suggesting that 
multicollinearity might be a problem. In order to mitigate this problem, I examined the 
variance inflation factors. Table 8 shows that the mean variance inflation factor is 3.60 
which indicates low collinearity. 
Main effects and moderation effects 
Table 2 presents the main effects of FDI on human development and tests the moderation 
effects of institutions. Model 1 contains the control variables, and the subsequent model 
contains the main effects of FDI and human development and the moderation effects. I 
found strong support for Hypothesis 1 (Model 2), which describes an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between FDI inflows and human development, as the main effect of FDI is 
positive and significant (β = 0.006, p < 0.001) and the extent of FDI inflows squared is 
negative and significant (β = ‒0.000, p < 0.001). 
I also conducted the three-step procedure suggested by Haans et al. (2016) to test 
the inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI and human development shown in Table 3 
(Model 1). First, the main effects of inward FDI stock and inward FDI stock squared 
coefficients are statistically significant and of the expected sign. Second, the slope analysis 
is positive and significant at low levels of FDI (β = 0.006, p < 0.001) and negative and 
significant at high levels of FDI (β = ‒0.004, p < 0.001). Third, the turning point of the 
inverted U-shaped curve is well located within the data range. Thus, these findings provide 
evidence in support of the inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI and human 
development. 
Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 are supported (Table 2), and the results endorse the 
moderating role of institutions, as the interaction term between inward FDI stock squared 
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and business sophistication is statistically significant and with the expected sign (β = 0.000, 
p < 0.01). In addition, the analysis also supports the significance of the interaction term 
between inward FDI stock squared and transparency (β = 0.003, p < 0.001). These results 
offer support for the idea that institutions moderate the relationship between FDI and 
human development. 
To more accurately explain and display how business sophistication and 
transparency affect the nonlinear relationship between FDI and human development, I 
plotted the moderating relationships (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991), and considered margins 
to draw these graphs one standard deviation below and above the mean to represent the low 
and high values of business sophistication and transparency. Figure 2 shows the moderating 
effects of business sophistication (Hypothesis 2.1). The interaction graph indicates that 
countries with low business sophistication exhibit a steeper inverted U-shaped curve 
between FDI and human development. However, the graph shows that for the negative 
slope at high levels of FDI, the confidence intervals are wide. This might indicate that the 
sample size for this side of the curve is small. Conversely, high business sophistication 
appears to facilitate a slightly positive relationship between FDI and human development, 
indicating that the moderation has a flattening effect. These results confirm Hypothesis 2.1, 
which suggests that the inverted U-shaped curve is flatter in countries with high business 
sophistication than in those with low business sophistication. 
Figure 3 illustrates how transparency moderates the nonlinear relationship between 
FDI and human development (Hypothesis 2.2). According to expectations, countries with 
low transparency experience a rather steep curve between FDI and human development. 
However, the figure shows that the confidence intervals are wide for the negative slope of 
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the graph, indicating that the sample size is small. On the contrary, in line with Hypothesis 
2.2, I found that countries with high transparency experience a flatter inverted U-shaped 
curve between FDI and human development. Thus, these results show that the hypothesized 
direction of the curve accords with expectations. 
Robustness analysis 
To verify my findings with greater confidence, I performed several robustness tests. 
First, I tested the model using alternative measures of FDI, FDI inflows, and FDI 
stock as a percentage of GDP (FDI stock/GDP). I found the results to be consistent with 
those of the main effects, supporting an inverted U-shaped curve. The results are illustrated 
in Table 4 and reveal that the main effects between FDI inflows and FDI stock/GDP are 
positive and statistically significant (β = 0.027, p < 0.001; β = 0.001, p < 0.001). In 
addition, the effects of FDI inflows and FDI stock/GDP squared are negative and 
statistically significant (β = ‒0.003, p < 0.001; β = ‒0.000, p < 0.001). 
Second, I tested that inward FDI stock has an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
each of the human development components. The results are illustrated in Table 5 and 
support FDI’s significantly positive effects on education (Model 1), health (Model 2), and 
income per capita (Model 3), respectively (β = 0.009, p < 0.001; β = 0.004, p < 0.001; β = 
362.392, p < 0.001). The effects of FDI-squared are negative and significant, respectively 
(β = ‒0.000, p < 0.001; β = ‒0.000, p < 0.001; β = ‒3.413, p < 0.001). Additionally, I tested 
the relationship between FDI inflows and inward FDI stock/GDP and the components of 
human development. The results are consistent with the effects of FDI inflows, supporting 
the inverted U-shaped relationship in each component. 
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Third, I conducted the moderations analysis on the relationship between FDI 
inflows and inward FDI stock/GDP. The results are illustrated in Table 6. Models 1 and 2 
show that the moderation effect of institutions on the relationship between FDI inflows and 
human development support the analysis from the main effects. The interaction term 
between FDI inflows-squared and business sophistication is statistically significant and 
with the expected sign (β = 0.004, p < 0.001). In addition, the analysis supports the 
significance of the interaction term between FDI inflows-squared and transparency (β = 
0.120, p < 0.01). However, the results do not show support for the moderation effect of 
business sophistication on the relationship between inward FDI stock/GDP and human 
development. The interaction term between inward FDI stock/GDP-squared and 
transparency is statistically significant and with the expected sign (β = 0.000, p < 0.01). 
Finally, I conducted the three-step procedures suggested by Haans et al. (2016) to 
test the inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI inflows and inward FDI stock/GDP 
and human development. Table 7 illustrates the results and supports each of the three steps 
to confirm the inverted U-shaped relationship. Thus, these findings provide evidence in 
support of the inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI inflows and inward FDI/GDP 
and human development. In addition, I performed the three-step procedure to confirm the 
existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI inflows and inward FDI 
stock/GDP and each of the human development components. The results support the 
existence of a U-inverted shaped relationship. 
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SECTION 6 - DISCUSSION 
This research was motivated by the desire of better understand how FDI affects human 
wellbeing and broadens people’s choices and opportunities. This thesis contributes to the 
literature by examining the fundamental effects of FDI on human development. As noted 
earlier, prior research has primarily prioritized FDI’s effect on economic growth, domestic 
productivity, and knowledge spillover. While these studies have been crucial to understand 
FDI effects, this research is the first one that considers the counteracting positive and 
negative effects of FDI on a social outcome (human development). Finally, this thesis is 
also innovative in terms of identifying contingencies of the FDI effects. 
The main contributions of this thesis attempt to meet the lacking literature on (i) the 
effect of inward FDI on human development and (ii) the integrated outcome of both 
positive and negative effects of FDI. First, this study demonstrates that FDI has an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with human development. At modest levels, FDI increases human 
development; yet as FDI increases, it leads to a negative association with human 
development. While FDI offers benefits that enhance human development, such as host 
country’s economic growth and higher income which in turn are likely to encourage 
governments and individuals to spend more on education and health. It has also a negative 
effect on human development by distributing these benefits unevenly, this research 
demonstrates that a key cost of FDI for human development is income inequality (Basu & 
Guariglia, 2007; Chintrakarn, Herzer, & Nunnenkamp, 2012; Choi, 2006; Herzer, Hühne, 
& Nunnenkamp, 2014; Pan-Long, 1995). This could lead to inequalities in income, 
education, and health. Thus, FDI might improve the host country’s economic growth and 
income, but that improvement might not be reflected on individuals’ lives and development 
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due to the increased inequality. Second, given FDI’s counteracting positive and negative 
effects on human development, the results suggested that the net effect of these 
counteracting arguments is a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped relationship. These results are 
consistent with my predictions that FDI enhances economic growth and high income in the 
host country (Borensztein, De Gregorio, & Lee, 1998), and exerts a positive effect on 
human development. However, alongside these benefits, FDI also increases income 
inequality (Herzer et al., 2014); ultimately, these negative effects will outweigh FDI’s 
initial positive benefits which result in an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
Third, I drew upon the FDI’s contingent effects argument (Meyer & Sinani, 2009) 
which highlights the importance to understand when FDI effects affect differently. In doing 
so, I use the host country’s institutional maturity in its private and public sectors to examine 
how the role of institutions affects the relationship between FDI and human development. 
My findings showed that the inverted U-shaped relationship between FDI and human 
development is moderated by the development of the host country’s institutions. 
Particularly, the results showed that less sophisticated economies experience a steeper 
inverted U-shaped curve between FDI and human development. These economies are more 
likely to experience higher benefits that enhance human development; however, they are 
also likely to experience higher costs, which decrease human development. Conversely, 
sophisticated economies have a flatter inverted U-shaped curve, and are more likely to have 
developed markets and thus experience fewer benefits; however, at higher levels of FDI, 
the cost associated with foreign investment might rise. In addition, low-transparency 
economies experience a steeper U-shaped curve than those that possess high transparency. 
These economies will probably have a poorly regulated public environment where MNEs 
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are more able to introduce higher benefits; however; this means they can also take 
advantage of these economies, thus incurring more costs. Conversely, high-transparency 
economies experience fewer benefits and costs, since they are more likely to possess a 
regulated public sector in which there is minimal space for MNEs to take control and gain 
leverage. In sum, these moderations are particularly important for supporting this thesis’s 
main hypothesis and understanding FDI’s contingent effects on human development. This 
demonstrates the importance of the host country’s institutional development which can 
affect the extent of the benefits and costs of FDI. This thesis corroborates the concept that 
strategically, FDI is most important for countries that most strongly require it, but it is also 
more likely to harm these countries. 
Practical Implications 
My findings have important implications for governments, MNEs, people and 
policy makers. The results suggest that while host countries will most probably benefit 
from FDI, they will also most probably incur in its costs. This highlights the importance of 
integrating FDI benefits and costs; a key consideration is that host economies must exercise 
caution in welcoming FDI. MNEs are more likely to boost host countries’ economic 
growth, income, and business environments, yet will also weaken host economies via 
associated costs such as inequality. This study suggests that FDI is not fostering human 
development as much as economic growth—therefore, host economies must be more 
careful in their approach to FDI, and analyze the possible benefits and costs associated with 
people’s lives and how host economies can achieve certain levels of human development.  
This study also emphasizes the importance of context for host country economies. 
Both the private- and public-sector moderators attained similar results in this study, despite 
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the differences between the two sectors. In economies with weak institutions, MNEs are 
likely to benefit host country institutions through demonstration effects, knowledge 
transfer, and requiring firmly established practices and processes. These foreign firms play 
an integral role in shaping the economy to create a better business market, and acting as 
agents of change that can facilitate clear and transparent practices and policies. However, 
this excessive power and leverage can lead to associated costs for the economy that can 
weaken both it and the host country’s society.  
The results also provide suggestions for policy makers on how to manage FDI 
inflows in order to maximize its benefits to human development. The unblind call to bring 
FDI at a fast pace to the host country is not always the best approach, host countries need to 
consider the costs involve. Therefore, limits on FDI inflows should be established in order 
to avoid an excess of control and leverage that might result on hurting the host country’s 
economy. In addition, my results demonstrate that institution’s maturity has an important 
role on FDI effects, sophisticated economies benefit from FDI at a more regulated rhythm. 
While less sophisticated economies experience greater benefits but also greater costs. Thus, 
while FDI should be considered a factor in economic growth, development and a source of 
knowledge, economies must also establish their own set of rules and processes to reduce 
foreign firms’ leverage and control of resources. 
Limitations and future research 
This study has a few limitations that offer opportunities for future research in this 
area. Many of the limitations of this study arise from the data used to analyze the model 
proposed. First, the human development measurement was only available at the country 
level, therefore the thesis model was adapted to be tested at the country level. Second, the 
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data available at the country level were unbalanced panel data—some countries possessed 
complete information, while others did not. Third, I examined the model of this thesis using 
variables with different nature (i.e. indexes, flows, stock), this limitation might require 
additional analysis to expand whether mixing these different types of variables might be 
appropriate. Fourth, the confidence intervals on the negative slopes are wide, indicating that 
the data sample is small. Subsequently, the high correlation and variance inflation factor of 
government expenditures does arise a concern of multicollinearity. Finally, while 
endogeneity and reverse causality have been considered in this study through the 
interaction effect in the moderation process. This should be tested more rigorously. 
In addition, other limitations such as the nature and intensity of FDI might have an 
effect on human development. For instance, different types of FDI generate demand for 
different pools of skilled and unskilled labor and these differences might influence human 
development differently. Furthermore, the period of time that foreign investment takes to 
establish in the host country might affect human development and income inequality. A 
time-series type of analysis might be desirable, showing the evolution of FDI stock over 
14-year period in a particular country and how that relates to its human development and 
also institutions maturity over time. This analysis might highlight the process of FDI in a 
host country as well as the existing deficiencies or capabilities.  
 Future studies may examine the effects of FDI on more precise social 
outcomes such as education and health, there is a lack of understanding on how FDI has an 
impact on individuals and their lives. Another important opportunity may be to consider the 
differences on the nature of FDI, entry strategies, technology oriented, resources oriented 
and specific time dimensions of these flows. These differences might help understanding 
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how the effects of FDI on the host country are different and which one is more beneficial. 
Finally, future research may consider different contingency effects of the host countries that 
might affect the FDI effects. This will enable host countries to understand and more 
accurately plan for their FDI strategy.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Tables analysis I 
Table 1 Correlations matrix and descriptive analytics 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Human 
Development 
Inward 
FDI stock 
Business 
Soph. 
Transparency Foreign 
aid 
Trade 
openness 
Gov. 
savings 
Gov. 
expenditure 
GDP 
             
(1) Human 
development 0.540 0.100 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(2) Inward FDI stock 1.331 3.401 0.135* 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(3) Business 
sophistication 3.485 0.392 0.11 0.565*** 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(4) Transparency 2.896 0.505 0.104 0.212** 0.094 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(5) Foreign aid 0.077 0.090 ‒0.136* 0.347*** 0.293*** 0.0713 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(6) Trade openness 77.941 34.927 0.392*** ‒0.0697 ‒0.184** 0.0269 ‒0.181** 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(7) Government 
savings 20.039 11.313 0.324*** 0.302*** 0.168* 0.345*** 0.134* 0.180** 1 ‒ ‒ 
(8) Government 
expenditure 6.746 23.333 0.0774 0.936*** 0.564*** 0.215** 0.263*** ‒0.178** 0.247*** 1 ‒ 
(9)	 Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)	 6.436	 22.123	 0.0777	 0.939***	 0.571***	 0.214**	 0.270***	 ‒0.182**	 0.256***	 0.999***	 1	
Note: 
a) See the variance inflation factor analysis in Table 8 
b) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
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Table 2 Fixed effects analysis: FDI stock effects and the moderation effect of 
institutions 
 Controls Main effects 
Moderation—
business 
sophistication 
Moderation—
transparency 
Dependent variable: 
human development (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         Main variables 
        Inward FDI stock ‒ 
 
0.005 *** 0.019 *** 0.109 *** 
Inward FDI stock squared  ‒ 
 
‒0.000 *** ‒0.000 ** ‒0.011 *** 
Business sophistication  ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
0.024 *** ‒ 
 Transparency  ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
0.012 ** 
         Interaction terms 
        Inward FDI stock x Bus 
sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.004 *** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock sq x 
Bus sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.000 ** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock x 
Transparency ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.028 *** 
Inward FDI stock sq x 
Transparency ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.003 *** 
         Controls 
        Foreign aid 0.126 *** 0.066 *** 0.019 * 0.022 
 Trade openness 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 
 
0.000 
 Government savings 0.001 *** 0.001 *** ‒0.000 ** ‒0.000 
 Government expenditure 0.005 *** 0.000 
 
‒0.000 
 
‒0.001 
 GDP ‒0.003 *** ‒0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.004 
 
         Constant 0.513 *** 0.574 *** 0.532 *** 0.453 *** 
Observations 1,040 
 
916 
 
512 
 
351 
 Country No 131 
 
130 
 
82 
 
60 
 Fixed effects Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 R-squared (within) 0.286 
 
0.300 
 
0.381 
 
0.320 
 
         Note: 
        a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years which 
explains the different observations in each model 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 3 Inverted U analysis: Testing inverted U-shaped relationships of main effects 
and moderations (Haans et al., 2016) 
 
 Main effects 
Moderation—
business 
sophistication 
Moderation—
transparency 
Dependent variable: human development (1) (2) (3) 
       Slope:       
Inward FDI stock 
      Slope at lowest point 0.005 
 
0.019 
 
0.109 
 
 
(11.58) *** (5.99) *** (5.944) *** 
Slope at the highest point ‒0.004 
 
‒0.021 
 
‒0.378 
 
 
(‒7.131) *** (‒2.145) * (‒3.298) *** 
       
       Appropriate Inverted U test: 
      Extremum point 48.354 
 
39.253 
 
5.076 
 
 
(7.13) *** (2.15) * (3.3) *** 
       90% confidence interval: 
      Lower level 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 Upper level 83.288 
 
83.288 
 
22.655 
 
       Note: 
      a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
 c) t-values are in parentheses 
      d) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
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Table 4 Robustness test: Nonlinear effects of FDI inflows and inward FDI stock/GDP 
on human development 
 
 
FDI inflows  Inward FDI stock/GDP 
Dependent variable: human 
development (1)  (2) 
      Main variables 
     FDI inflows 0.026 *** 
 
 ‒ 
 FDI inflows squared ‒0.003 *** 
 
 ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP  ‒ 
  
0.002 *** 
Inward FDI FDI stock/GDP squared  ‒ 
  
‒0.000 *** 
      Controls 
     Foreign aid 0.069 *** 
 
0.063 *** 
Trade openness 0.000 * 
 
0.000 ** 
Government savings 0.000 ** 
 
0.001 *** 
Government expenditure ‒0.000 
  
0.002 *** 
GDP 0.001 
  
‒0.001 ** 
      Constant 0.577 *** 
 
0.544 *** 
Observations 904 
  
915 
 Country No 128 
  
129 
 Fixed effects Included 
  
Included 
 R-squared (within) 0.236 
  
0.284 
 
      
      Note: 
     a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years which 
explains the different observations in each model 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 5 Robustness test: Nonlinear effects of FDI on human development components 
 
Inward FDI Stock FDI Inflows Inward FDI Stock/GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable Education index Health index GNI per capita 
Education 
index Health index GNI per capita 
Education 
index Health index GNI per capita 
Main variables                   
Inward FDI stock 0.010 *** 0.004 *** 368.147 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 Inward FDI stock squared ‒0.000 *** ‒0.000 *** ‒3.348 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
0.058 *** 0.019 *** 1,902.599 *** ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 FDI inflows squared ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
‒0.007 *** ‒0.002 *** ‒195.703 *** ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.003 *** 0.001 *** 63.725 *** 
Inward FDI stock/GDP squared ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.000 *** ‒0.000 *** ‒0.410 *** 
                   Controls 
                  Foreign aid 0.294 *** 0.059 ** 579.700 
 
0.299 *** 0.062 ** 625.220 
 
0.220 *** 0.060 ** 964.432 
 Trade openness 0.001 *** 0.000 ** ‒15.436 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 * ‒16.574 *** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** ‒14.498 *** 
Government savings 0.001 ** 0.000 * 43.175 *** 0.001 
 
0.000 
 
38.674 *** 0.001 ** 0.000 * 46.951 *** 
Government expenditure ‒0.002 
 
0.000 
 
‒51.695 
 
‒0.004 * 0.000 
 
‒44.136 
 
0.005 ** 0.002 * 126.737 *** 
GDP 0.002 
 
‒0.000 
 
57.757 
 
0.005 ** 0.001 
 
101.929 * ‒0.004 ** ‒0.001 * ‒83.685 * 
                   Constant 0.456 *** 0.681 *** 7,797.103 *** 0.450 *** 0.683 *** 7,880.254 *** 0.414 *** 0.656 *** 6,817.016 *** 
Observations 623 
 
913 
 
939 
 
611 
 
901 
 
927 
 
623 
 
912 
 
938 
 Country No 115 
 
137 
 
137 
 
115 
 
135 
 
135 
 
115 
 
136 
 
136 
 Fixed effects Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 R-squared (within) 0.392 
 
0.122 
 
0.315 
 
0.354 
 
0.096 
 
0.233 
 
0.451 
 
0.136 
 
0.206 
 Note:                   
a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 6 Robustness test: Moderation effect of institutions on the relationship between 
FDI inflows, inward FDI stock/GDP and human development 
 
FDI inflows Inward FDI stock/GDP 
Dependent variable: human development (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Main variables 
        FDI inflows 0.138 *** 0.500 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows squared ‒0.017 *** ‒0.479 ** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.002 * 0.002 * 
Inward FDI stock/GDP squared ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.000 * ‒0.000 ** 
Business Sophistication 0.017 *** ‒ 
 
‒0.008 
 
‒ 
 Transparency ‒  0.009 * ‒  0.001  
         Interaction terms 
        FDI inflows x Bus sophistication ‒0.030 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows sq x Bus sophistication 0.004 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows x Transparency ‒ 
 
‒0.131 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows sq x Transparency ‒ 
 
0.135 ** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP x Bus 
Sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.001 ** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP sq x Bus 
Sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.000 ** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP x Transparency ‒  ‒  ‒  ‒0.000  
Inward FDI stock/GDP sq x Transparency ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.000 * 
         Controls 
        Foreign aid 0.020 
 
0.012 
 
0.020 
 
0.007 
 Trade openness ‒0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 Government savings ‒0.001 *** ‒0.000  ‒0.000 ** ‒0.000  
Government expenditures ‒0.000 
 
‒0.003 
 
0.001 
 
‒0.002 
 GDP 0.001 
 
0.004 
 
‒0.001 
 
0.003 
          
Constant 0.571 *** 0.479 *** 0.646 *** 0.477 *** 
Observations 507  344  512  350  
Country No 82  59  82  59  
Fixed effects Incl.  Incl.  Incl.  Incl.  
R-squared (within) 0.2680  0.2327  0.2447  0.1991  
         Note:         
a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 7 Robustness test: Inverted U analysis of inward FDI stock, FDI inflows and inward FDI stock/GDP on HDI components 
 Inward FDI Stock FDI Inflows 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: Education index Health index GNI per capita Human development Education index Health index GNI per capita 
Slope:               
Inward FDI stock 
              Slope at lowest point 0.010 
 
0.004 
 
368.147 
 
 ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 
(10.089) *** (6.685) *** (13.797) ***  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 Slope at the highest point ‒0.006 
 
‒0.003 
 
‒189.595 
 
 ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 
(‒5.356) *** (‒3.574) *** (‒6.048) *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 FDI inflows 
              Slope at lowest point  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
0.026 
 
0.058 
 
0.019 
 
1,902.598 
   ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
(7.243) *** (6.895) *** (4.372) *** (9.037) *** 
Slope at the highest point  ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
‒0.054 
 
‒0.105 
 
‒0.038 
 
‒2,950.238 
 
 
‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
(‒6.424) *** (‒5.405) *** (‒3.489) *** (‒5.903) *** 
Appropriate Inverted U test: 
              Extremum point 49.648 
 
50.630 
 
54.976 
 
3.993 
 
4.439 
 
4.166 
 
4.861 
  (5.36) *** (3.57) *** (6.05) *** (6.42) *** (5.4) *** (3.49) *** (5.9) *** 
90% confidence interval: 
              Lower level 0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 Upper level 83.288 
 
83.288 
 
83.288 
 
12.399 
 
12.399 
 
12.399 
 
12.399 
 Note:               
a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) t-values are in parentheses 
d) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
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Moderation effects 
        
 
FDI inflows and 
bus. 
sophistication 
FDI inflows 
and 
transparency 
Inward FDI stock/GDP 
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Dependent variable: Human development 
Human 
development 
Human 
development 
Education 
index Health index 
GNI per 
capita 
Slope:             
FDI inflows     
        Slope at lowest point 0.138  0.500   ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 
(6.447) *** (4.583) ***  ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 Slope at the highest point ‒0.281  ‒4.015   ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 
(‒5.327) *** (‒2.987) **  ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 
 ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP     
        Slope at lowest point  ‒   ‒  0.002 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
63.679 
 
 
 ‒   ‒  (11.002) *** (12.382) *** (7.662) *** (7.303) *** 
Slope at the highest point  ‒   ‒  ‒0.002 
 
‒0.003 
 
‒0.002 
 
‒91.222 
 
 
 ‒   ‒  (‒7.31) *** (‒5.519) *** (‒5.598) *** (‒4.642) *** 
Appropriated inverted U test:     
        Extremum point 4.081  0.522  75.494 
 
93.362 
 
71.707 
 
77.787 
 
 
(5.33) *** (2.99) ** (7.31) *** (5.52) *** (5.6) *** (4.64) *** 
90% confidence interval:     
        Lower level 0.000  0.000  0.056 
 
0.285 
 
0.056 
 
0.056 
 Upper level 12.399  4.710  189.137 
 
189.137 
 
189.137 
 
189.137 
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Table 8 Robustness test: Multicollinearity test diagnostics 
 
Variable 
Variance 
Inflation 
Factor 
(VIF) 
VIF Squared Tolerance R - Squared 
(1) Human development 1.36 1.17 0.734 0.266 
(2) Inward FDI stock 10.93 3.31 0.092 0.909 
(3) Business sophistication 1.64 1.28 0.61 0.39 
(4) Transparency 1.17 1.08 0.853 0.147 
(5) Foreign aid 1.33 1.15 0.751 0.249 
(6) Trade openness 1.48 1.22 0.676 0.324 
(7) Government savings 1.47 1.21 0.68 0.321 
(8) Government expenditures 1073.08 32.76 0.001 0.999 
(9) GDP 1129.96 33.61 0.001 0.999 
 
Mean VIF 246.94    
 
 
Eigenval Condition Index 
1 6.715 1.000 
2 2.369 1.684 
3 0.511 3.627 
4 0.175 6.189 
5 0.133 7.114 
6 0.053 11.282 
7 0.025 16.335 
8 0.015 20.904 
9 0.004 43.323 
10 0.000 126.742 
Condition Number 126.742 
Eigenvalues & Cond 
Index computed from 
scaled raw sscp (w/ 
intercept) 
Det (correlation matrix) 
-  
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Tables analysis II 
Table 1 Correlations matrix and descriptive analytics 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Human 
Development 
Inward 
FDI stock 
Business 
Soph. 
Transparency Foreign 
aid 
Trade 
openness 
Gov. 
savings 
GDP 
            
(1) Human 
development 0.548 0.105 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(2) Inward FDI stock 1.236 3.21 0.1 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(3) Business 
sophistication 3.496 0.394 0.160** 0.518*** 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(4) Transparency 2.91 0.503 0.124* 0.197** 0.0879 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(5) Foreign aid 0.076 0.087 ‒0.185** 0.343*** 0.238*** 0.0762 1 ‒ ‒ ‒ 
(6) Trade openness 79.088 34.507 0.368*** ‒0.0777 ‒0.166** ‒0.000439 ‒0.216*** 1 ‒ ‒ 
(7) Government 
savings 19.481 11.008 0.231*** 0.304*** 0.152* 0.324*** 0.165** 0.102 1 
 (8)	 Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)	 5.867	 20.864	 0.052	 0.939***	 0.529***	 0.196**	 0.267***	 ‒0.184**	 0.260***	 1	
 
Note: 
a) See the variance inflation factor analysis in Table 8 
b) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
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Table 2 Fixed effects analysis: FDI stock effects and the moderation effect of 
institutions 
 Controls Main effects 
Moderation—
business 
sophistication 
Moderation—
transparency 
Dependent variable: 
human development (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         Main variables 
        Inward FDI stock ‒ 
 
0.006 *** 0.019 *** 0.095 *** 
Inward FDI stock squared ‒ 
 
‒0.000 *** ‒0.000 *** ‒0.010 *** 
Business sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.023 *** ‒ 
 Transparency ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.009 ** 
         Interaction terms 
        Inward FDI stock x Bus 
sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.004 *** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock sq x 
Bus sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.000 ** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock x 
Transparency ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.023 *** 
Inward FDI stock sq x 
Transparency ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.003 *** 
         Controls 
        Foreign aid 0.051 ** 0.025 ** 0.018 * 0.036 ** 
Trade openness 0.001 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 Government savings 0.001 *** 0.001 *** ‒0.000 ** ‒0.000 
 GDP 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.003 *** 
         Constant 0.523 *** 0.584 *** 0.539 *** 0.484 *** 
Observations 1,243 
 
1,081 
 
550 
 
444 
 Country No 140 
 
139 
 
90 
 
65 
 Fixed effects Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 R-squared (within) 0.229 
 
0.266 
 
0.374 
 
0.311 
 
         
         Note: 
        a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years which 
explains the different observations in each model 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 3 Inverted U analysis: Testing inverted U-shaped relationships of main effects 
and moderations (Haans et al., 2016) 
 Main effects 
Moderation—
business 
sophistication 
Moderation—
transparency 
Dependent variable: human development (1) (2) (3) 
       Slope:       
Inward FDI stock 
      Slope at lowest point 0.006 
 
0.019 
 
0.095 
 
 
(13.941) *** (6.276) *** (5.86) *** 
Slope at the highest point ‒0.004 
 
‒0.022 
 
‒0.359 
 
 
(‒7.538) *** (‒2.289) * (‒4.002) *** 
       
       Appropriate Inverted U test: 
      Extremum point 49.453 
 
38.952 
 
4.749 
 
 
(7.54) *** (2.29) * (4) *** 
       90% confidence interval: 
      Lower level 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 Upper level 83.288 
 
83.288 
 
22.655 
 
       Note: 
      a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
 c) t-values are in parentheses 
      d) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
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Table 4 Robustness test: Nonlinear effects of FDI inflows and inward FDI stock/GDP 
on human development 
 
 
FDI inflows  Inward FDI stock/GDP 
Dependent variable: human 
development (1)  (2) 
      Main variables 
     FDI inflows 0.027 *** 
 
 ‒ 
 FDI inflows squared  ‒0.003 *** 
 
 ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP  ‒ 
  
0.001 *** 
Inward FDI FDI stock/GDP squared  ‒ 
  
 ‒0.000 *** 
      Controls 
     Foreign aid 0.027 ** 
 
0.027 ** 
Trade openness 0.000 
  
 ‒0.000 
 Government savings 0.000 ** 
 
0.001 *** 
GDP 0.001 *** 
 
0.001 *** 
      Constant 0.587 *** 
 
0.567 *** 
Observations 1,067 
  
1,072 
 Country No 138 
  
138 
 Fixed effects Included 
  
Included 
 R-squared (within) 0.208 
  
0.217 
 
      
      Note: 
     a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years which 
explains the different observations in each model 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 5 Robustness test: Nonlinear effects of FDI on human development components 
 
Inward FDI Stock FDI Inflows Inward FDI Stock/GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable Education index Health index GNI per capita 
Education 
index Health index GNI per capita 
Education 
index Health index GNI per capita 
Main variables                   
Inward FDI stock 0.009 *** 0.004 *** 362.392 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 Inward FDI stock squared ‒0.000 *** ‒0.000 *** ‒3.413 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
0.053 *** 0.021 *** 1,857.511 *** 
 
 
 
 
  FDI inflows squared ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
‒0.006 *** ‒0.003 *** ‒190.279 *** 
 
 
 
 
  Inward FDI stock/GDP ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.003 *** 0.001 *** 38.595 *** 
Inward FDI stock/GDP squared ‒  ‒  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.000 *** ‒0.000 *** ‒0.084 ** 
                   Controls 
                  Foreign aid 0.268 *** 0.024 * 219.088 
 
0.263 *** 0.025 * 346.645 
 
0.266 *** 0.027 ** 473.868 
 Trade openness 0.000 *** 0.000 ** ‒11.582 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 * ‒13.661 *** 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
‒16.494 *** 
Government savings 0.001 ** 0.000 * 39.895 *** 0.001 ** 0.000 
 
30.589 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 48.852 *** 
GDP 0.000 * 0.000 
 
13.390 ** 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 60.719 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 33.419 *** 
                   Constant 0.459 *** 0.690 *** 8,044.360 *** 0.456 *** 0.693 *** 8,331.169 *** 0.423 *** 0.679 *** 7,607.545 *** 
Observations 761 
 
1,097 
 
1,131 
 
745 
 
1,084 
 
1,118 
 
756 
 
1,088 
 
1,122 
 Country No 140 
 
141 
 
141 
 
140 
 
140 
 
140 
 
139 
 
140 
 
140 
 Fixed effects Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 R-squared (within) 0.349 
 
0.105 
 
0.265 
 
0.314 
 
0.079 
 
0.201 
 
0.419 
 
0.100 
 
0.171 
 Note:                   
a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 6 Robustness test: Moderation effect of institutions on the relationship between 
FDI inflows, inward FDI stock/GDP and human development 
 
FDI inflows Inward FDI stock/GDP 
Dependent variable: human development (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Main variables 
        FDI inflows 0.137 *** 0.403 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows squared ‒0.017 *** ‒0.430 ** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.002 * 0.001 * 
Inward FDI stock/GDP squared ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.000 * ‒0.000 ** 
Business Sophistication 0.017 *** ‒ 
 
‒0.009 
 
‒ 
 Transparency ‒  0.005  ‒  ‒0.002  
         Interaction terms 
        FDI inflows x Bus sophistication ‒0.030 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows sq x Bus sophistication 0.004 *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows x Transparency ‒ 
 
‒0.098 ** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows sq x Transparency ‒ 
 
0.120 ** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP x Bus 
Sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.001 ** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP sq x Bus 
Sophistication ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.000 ** ‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP x Transparency ‒  ‒  ‒  ‒0.000  
Inward FDI stock/GDP sq x Transparency ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.000 ** 
         Controls 
        Foreign aid 0.019 
 
0.027 * 0.020 * 0.023 
 Trade openness ‒0.000 
 
‒0.000 
 
‒0.000 
 
‒0.000 
 Government savings ‒0.001 *** ‒0.000  ‒0.000 ** ‒0.000  
GDP 0.001 *** 0.001 * 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 
         Constant 0.575 *** 0.514 *** 0.650 *** 0.512 *** 
Observations 545  437  543  436  
Country No 90  65  89  64  
Fixed effects Included  Included  Included  Included  
R-squared (within) 0.261  0.218  0.237  0.181  
         
Note:         
a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
d) The fixed effects accounts for time-invariant factors that exhibit systematic variations across countries 
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Table 7 Robustness test: Inverted U analysis of inward FDI stock, FDI inflows and inward FDI stock/GDP on HDI components 
 Inward FDI Stock FDI Inflows 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: Education index Health index GNI per capita Human development Education index Health index GNI per capita 
Slope:               
Inward FDI stock 
              Slope at lowest point 0.009 
 
0.004 
 
362.392 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 
(11.624) *** (8.259) *** (14.436) *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 Slope at the highest point ‒0.007 
 
‒0.003 
 
‒206.186 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 
(‒5.633) *** (‒3.908) *** (‒6.483) *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 FDI inflows 
              Slope at lowest point ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
0.03 
 
0.053 
 
0.021 
 
1,857.510 
  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
(9.571) *** (8.116) *** (5.865) *** (10.527) *** 
Slope at the highest point ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒0.06 
 
‒0.093 
 
‒0.041 
 
‒2,860.832 
 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
(‒7.43) *** (‒5.345) *** (‒4.243) *** (‒5.998) *** 
Appropriate Inverted U test: 
              Extremum point 48.288 
 
51.498 
 
53.085 
 
4.004 
 
4.487 
 
4.132 
 
4.881 
  (5.63) *** (3.91) *** (6.48) *** (7.43) *** (5.34) *** (4.24) *** (6) *** 
90% confidence interval: 
              Lower level 0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 Upper level 83.288 
 
83.288 
 
83.288 
 
12.3985 
 
12.399 
 
12.399 
 
12.399 
 Note:               
a) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
b) All independent and control variables were included with a one-year lag 
c) t-values are in parentheses 
d) The sample is an unbalanced panel data that includes up to 139 countries over a period of 14 years 
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Moderation effects 
        
 
FDI inflows 
and bus. 
sophistication 
FDI inflows 
and 
transparency 
Inward FDI stock/GDP 
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Dependent variable: Human development 
Human 
development 
Human 
development 
Education 
index Health index 
GNI per 
capita 
Slope:             
FDI inflows     
        Slope at lowest point 0.137  0.403  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 
(6.64) *** (4.173) *** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 Slope at the highest point ‒0.276  ‒3.646  ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
 
(‒5.473) *** (‒2.976) ** ‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 
‒ 
 Inward FDI stock/GDP     
        Slope at lowest point ‒  ‒  0.001 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
38.585 
 
 
‒  ‒  (10.84) *** (13.983) *** (6.758) *** (6.884) *** 
Slope at the highest point ‒  ‒  ‒0.001 
 
‒0.002 
 
‒0.000 
 
‒3.802 
 
 
‒  ‒  (‒5.364) *** (‒4.553) *** (‒1.371) 
 
(‒0.484) 
 Appropriated inverted U test:     
        Extremum point 4.081  0.469  124.231 
 
151.451 
 
190.419 
 
230.203 
 
 
(5.47) *** (2.98) ** (5.36) *** (4.55) *** (1.37) 
 
(0.48) 
 90% confidence interval:     
        Lower level 0.000  0.000  0.056 
 
0.285 
 
0.056 
 
0.056 
 Upper level 12.399  4.710  252.879 
 
252.879 
 
248.558 
 
252.879 
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Table 8 Robustness test: Multicollinearity test diagnostics 
 
Variable 
Variance 
Inflation 
Factor (VIF) 
VIF 
Squared Tolerance R - Squared 
(1) Human development 1.34 1.16 0.746 0.254 
(2) Inward FDI stock 10.59 3.25 0.095 0.906 
(3) Business sophistication 1.50 1.22 0.668 0.332 
(4) Transparency 1.14 1.07 0.876 0.124 
(5) Foreign aid 1.34 1.16 0.744 0.256 
(6) Trade openness 1.38 1.18 0.723 0.277 
(7) Government savings 1.27 1.13 0.787 0.213 
(8) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 10.27 3.20 0.097 0.903 
 
Mean VIF 3.60 
    
 
Eigenval Condition Index 
1 6.461  1.000  
2 1.654  1.968  
3 0.496  3.584  
4 0.179  5.985  
5 0.124  7.229  
6 0.042  10.195  
7 0.025  16.065  
8 0.016  19.831  
9 0.004  41.177  
Condition Number 40.592 
Eigenvalues & Cond 
Index computed from 
scaled raw sscp (w/ 
intercept) 
Det (correlation matrix) 0.034 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Research model 
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Figure 2 Interaction effect of business sophistication and Inward FDI stock on host 
country’s human development (adjusted for effects of control variables) 
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Figure 3 Interaction effect of transparency and Inward FDI stock on host country’s 
human development (adjusted for effects of control variables) 
 
  
78 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Measurement scale of business sophistication 
Indicator Question Answer options 
Local supplier quantity In your country, how numerous are 
local suppliers?  
1 = largely non-existent; 7 
= extremely numerous 
Local supplier quality In your country, how would you 
assess the quality of local 
suppliers?  
1 = extremely poor 
quality; 7 = extremely 
high quality 
State of cluster development In your country, how widespread 
are well-developed and deep 
clusters (geographic concentrations 
of firms, suppliers, producers of 
related products and services, and 
specialized institutions in a 
particular field)?  
1 = non-existent; 7 = 
widespread in many fields 
Nature of competitive 
advantage 
Upon what is the competitive 
advantage of your country’s 
companies in international markets 
based?  
1 = low-cost labor or 
natural resources; 7 = 
unique products and 
processes 
Production process 
sophistication 
In your country, how sophisticated 
are production processes?  
1 = not at all—production 
uses labor-intensive 
processes or old 
technology; 7 = highly—
production uses 
sophisticated and 
knowledge-intensive 
processes 
Value chain breadth In your country, do companies 
have a narrow or broad presence in 
the value chain?  
1 = narrow, primarily 
involved in individual 
steps of the value chain 
(e.g., resource extraction 
or production); 7 = broad, 
present across the entire 
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value chain (e.g., 
including production and 
marketing, distribution, 
design, etc.) 
Control of international 
distribution 
To what extent are international 
distribution and marketing from 
your country owned and controlled 
by domestic companies?  
1 = not at all—they take 
place through foreign 
companies; 7 = to a great 
extent—they are primarily 
owned and controlled by 
domestic companies 
Extent of marketing In your country, to what extent do 
companies use sophisticated 
marketing tools and techniques?  
1 = not at all; 7 = to a 
great extent 
Willingness to delegate 
authority 
In your country, how do you assess 
the willingness to delegate 
authority to subordinates?  
1 = not willing at all—
senior management takes 
all important decisions; 7 
= very willing—authority 
is mostly delegated to 
business unit heads and 
other lower level 
managers 
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Appendix 2: List of the countries included on the sample 
1 Afghanistan 37 Czech Republic 
2 Albania 38 Denmark 
3 Algeria 39 Dominican Republic 
4 Angola 40 Ecuador 
5 Antigua and Barbuda 41 Egypt 
6 Argentina 42 El Salvador 
7 Armenia 43 Equatorial Guinea 
8 Azerbaijan 44 Estonia 
9 Bahamas 45 Ethiopia 
10 Bahrain 46 Gabon 
11 Bangladesh 47 Gambia 
12 Barbados 48 Georgia 
13 Belarus 49 Ghana 
14 Belize 50 Grenada 
15 Benin 51 Guatemala 
16 Bhutan 52 Guinea 
17 Bolivia 53 Guinea-Bissau 
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina 54 Guyana 
19 Botswana 55 Haiti 
20 Brazil 56 Honduras 
21 Bulgaria 57 Hungary 
22 Burkina Faso 58 India 
23 Burundi 59 Indonesia 
24 Cambodia 60 Iran 
25 Cameroon 61 Iraq 
26 Central African Republic 62 Israel 
27 Chile 63 Jamaica 
28 China 64 Jordan 
29 Colombia 65 Kazakhstan 
30 Comoros 66 Kenya 
31 Congo 67 Kuwait 
32 Congo, Dem. Rep. 68 Kyrgyzstan 
33 Costa Rica 69 Latvia 
34 Cote d'Ivoire 70 Lebanon 
35 Croatia 71 Lesotho 
36 Cyprus 72 Libya 
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73 Lithuania 109 Saudi Arabia 
74 Macedonia, FYR 110 Senegal 
75 Madagascar 111 Serbia 
76 Malawi 112 Seychelles 
77 Malaysia 113 Sierra Leone 
78 Maldives 114 Singapore 
79 Mali 115 Slovenia 
80 Malta 116 Solomon Islands 
81 Mauritania 117 South Africa 
82 Mauritius 118 South Korea 
83 Mexico 119 Sri Lanka 
84 Moldova 120 Sudan 
85 Mongolia 121 Swaziland 
86 Montenegro 122 Syria 
87 Morocco 123 Tajikistan 
88 Mozambique 124 Tanzania 
89 Namibia 125 Thailand 
90 Nepal 126 Togo 
91 Nicaragua 127 Trinidad and Tobago 
92 Niger 128 Tunisia 
93 Nigeria 129 Turkey 
94 Oman 130 Uganda 
95 Pakistan 131 Ukraine 
96 Panama 132 United Arab Emirates 
97 Papua New Guinea 133 Uruguay 
98 Paraguay 134 Uzbekistan 
99 Peru 135 Venezuela 
100 Philippines 136 Vietnam 
101 Poland 137 Yemen 
102 Qatar 138 Zambia 
103 Romania 139 Zimbabwe 
104 Russia 
 105 Rwanda 
  106 Saint Kitts and Nevis 
 107 Saint Lucia 
  108 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
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Appendix 3: Moderation matrix - Business Sophistication and Transparency 
 Low FDI	 High FDI 
Sophisticated 
Economies 
MNEs are less able to be active 
participants in the economy, and the host 
country will probably gain modest 
benefits, since it has achieved a certain 
level of economic development in its 
practices, strategies, and markets, and 
independence from foreign businesses	
MNEs are more likely to undertake a 
different role and shape the economy in 
which they acquire power and leverage 
in the host country. MNEs may influence 
these markets and take advantage of 
higher margins; this can generate lower 
government income and decrease 
workforce costs. MNEs pay minimal 
resources to their countries of 
investment, but substantially extract 
from these countries to increase their 
own profits; this translates to decreased 
human development. These different 
negative forces thus curtail the host 
country’s resources for individuals and 
government, leading to rising income 
inequality and scant increases in 
government revenue, which significantly 
diminishes human development. 
Less 
sophisticated 
economies 
These investments inject capital to 
advance business practice, which in turn 
generates more employment and 
increases workforce participation. 
Alongside this, foreign investments are 
more likely to provide higher revenue to 
governments and encourage the 
development of educational systems that 
support these industries; they also help 
enhance educational attainment and 
build human capital, which are key 
elements of economic growth	
MNEs’	investment	increases,	the	costs	of	this	will	most	probably	also	rise.	In	this	context,	such	capital	shapes	the	economy	and	the	role	of	foreign	firms	in	the	host	country	as	a	market	maker,	and	MNEs	then	tend	to	have	higher	leverage	and	control	over	domestic	firms,	government,	and	local	economy.	Therefore,	as	a	consequence	of	building	the	market,	MNEs	are	feasibly	able	to	negotiate	reduced	tax	rates	and	favorable	transactions	that	allow	them	to	improve	their	profit	margins.	In	addition,	MNEs	are	more	likely	to	offer	high	wages	only	to	specific	parts	of	the	workforce	(i.e.,	executives)	who	may	be	in	short	supply,	and	pay	relatively	low	wages	to	the	bulk	of	the	workforce	to	drive	down	costs.	MNEs	thus	create	a	gap	between	skilled	and	unskilled	employees’	income,	minimizing	incidental	investment	in	education,	training,	and	upgrading	skills. 
Economies with 
high transparency 
New foreign entrants are unlikely to 
contribute as much to the development 
of the public sector; these economies 
MNEs are less able to gain leverage and 
control over public policies, processes, 
and practice. Specifically, governments 
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might achieve standardized clear and 
transparent policies, procedures, public-
sector employee roles. Thus, when FDI 
has minimal effects on a host economy, 
the human development benefits are also 
smaller.	
in these economies are liable to be 
accountable for their actions and possess 
firm, transparent policies; foreign 
companies will thus experience a well-
regulated public sector. MNEs might 
find it difficult to gain advantage and 
leverage over resources and funds. 
Therefore, the costs associated with the 
effects of FDI on the host country’s 
public sector and, more importantly, 
FDI’s negative consequences on human 
development are non-significant. 
Economies with 
low transparency 
MNEs are particularly helpful for 
developing the institutional environment 
in such a way that foreign business may 
positively influence the host country’s 
policies and procedures, and be more 
likely to exercise regulatory and 
demonstration effects on the host 
country’s public institutions. These 
effects put pressure on public institutions 
to restructure at a more global level, thus 
enabling them to gain legitimacy and 
enact clear and transparent policies and 
practices.	
The costs of FDI are also likely to rise. 
In this context, foreign capital might 
acquire more leverage over public 
practices and processes, which gives 
MNEs more control over public-sector 
funds. This increased leverage comes at 
a cost, affecting both individuals and the 
host country. Specifically, MNEs have 
greater opportunity to extract resources 
from the host country with little 
accountability. 
 
